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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Supreme Court Update on
Reasonable Suspicion Analysis: A Review of the
Supreme Court Decisions in Illinois v. Wardlow and
Florida v. J.L.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its decision in Terry v. Ohio' authorizing brief investigatory stops on less
than probable cause and adopting the reasonable suspicion standard for such
detentions, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly examined the
sufficiency of articulable facts to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.2 The
Terry decision permits a police officer to briefly detain an individual based on
reasonable suspicion that he or she is or has been involved in criminal activity. The
decision also permits the officer to conduct a limited pat down or "frisk" for the
officer's safety, when based on reasonable suspicion that the person may be armed
and dangerous. These searches and seizures normally take place in "rapidly
unfolding and often dangerous situations"3 in which it would be impractical for
police to obtain a warrant and the risk of bodily injury from concealed weapons
makes it too dangerous for police to wait for probable cause to develop.4 Therefore,
the Court in Terry adopted a lesser standard of cause, reasonable suspicion, to
justify a brief investigatory detention and a limited weapons search. Unfortunately,
the test can be difficult to apply when articulable facts do not clearly point to
criminal activity. The Court, consequently, has returned to Terry on numerous
occasions to articulate what does and does not meet the reasonable suspicion
standard.
In Illinoisv. Wardlow5 and Floridav. J.L.6 the United States Supreme Court once
again addressed Terry and its progeny. Wardlow and JL.presented the Court with
ambiguous facts that are at or very near the threshold requirements for investigatory
stops. In highly fact-based analyses, the Court discussed articulable facts that may
or may not create reasonable suspicion in relation to Fourth Amendment
investigatory stops.7 In Wardlow, the Court held that sudden, unprovoked flight in
an area of high crime creates the reasonable suspicion required for a police officer
to briefly detain an individual.8 The Court explained that reasonable suspicion must
be based on common sense and inferences about human behavior. 9 In J.L, the Court
held that an anonymous tip, with minimal corroboration, does not meet the
reasonable suspicion standard." While the police were able to find individuals to

1. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."
3. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10.
4. RobertG. lndauer Jr., State v. Pearson andState v. McClendon: Determining Reasonable, Articulable
Suspicion from the Totality of the Circumstances in North Carolina, 78 N.C. L REV. 831, 831-32 (Mar. 2000).
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

528 U.S. 119(2000).

529 U.S. 266 (2000).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25.
Id. at 125.
J.L, 529 U.S. at 268.
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match the description in the tip, the Court reasoned that corroboration based solely
on an individual's description does not meet the standard."
This Note analyzes the implications of these two opinions for both law
enforcement officials and criminal law attorneys. Part 1I examines the history of
stop and frisk under the Fourth Amendment since the landmark decision of Terry
v. Ohio. 2 Part Ill sets out the facts and the reasoning used by the lower courts as
well as the rationale of the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Wardlow. Part IV sets out
the facts and the reasoning used by the lower courts in Floridav. J.L as well as the
rationale of the Supreme Court. Finally, part V analyzes the Court's opinion
regarding the Fourth Amendment issues in each of the two cases and examines the
possible future implications of the decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment requires that every search and seizure by a government
official be reasonable. 3 Reasonableness has been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court to mean that an arrest or search must be based on probable cause
and/or executed pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause. 4 The Court,
however, has noted numerous exceptions to these requirements. 5 Additionally,
while detaining an individual has been found to be a "seizure," an officer does not
seize a person under the Fourth Amendment by simply approaching an individual
in a public place and asking if the person will answer a few questions. 6 Thus,

11. See id. at 272.

12. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. TV.

14. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment imposes a
presumptive warrant requirement for searches and seizures).
15. See Audrey Benison, Matthew J. Gardner, Amy S. Manning, Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 87
GEo. L.J. 1124, 1124-25 (May 1999). These exceptions include

investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, seizure of items
in plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches, vehicle searches, container searches,
inventory searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in
which the special needs of law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements
impracticable.
Id.

16. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980). In Mendenhall, two Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agents approached the individual/defendant in the Detroit airport after observing behavior
characteristic of drug smugglers. Id. at 547. The agents asked to see the defendant's identification and airline ticket.
i at 548. After questioning, one of the agents asked if the defendant would accompany him to the airport DEA
office. Id. The defendant consented. Id. The Court found that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the officer
to the office and was under no duress in making her decision. See id at 558. The defendant was questioned briefly
and her identification and ticket were returned to her before she was asked to accompany the officer. Id. at 548.
The Court reasoned, therefore, that the defendant was free to decline to go with the officer and was free to leave
the area. See id. at 554. Compare with Florida v.Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). InRoyer, two plain-clothes detectives
at the Miami International Airport approached the defendant. 1d 493-94. The detectives believed that the
defendant's appearance, mannerisms, luggage, and actions fit the "drug courier profile." Id. at 493. The detectives
identified themselves to the defendant and asked if he had a moment to speak with them. Id. at 494. The defendant
responded, "Yes." Id. After asking for his ticket and identification, the detectives realized that there was a
discrepancy between the name on the ticket and the identification. Id. Without returning the ticket or the
identification, the detectives then asked the defendant to accompany them to a room approximately forty feet away.
Id. One of the detectives then retrieved the defendant's luggage. The defendant consented to searches of his two
suitcases and drugs were found in both. Id. The officers also took possession of his luggage. Id. at 503. The Court
reasoned that the defendant was not free to leave as the officers had taken possession of his ticket and
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because the individual is not "seized," the officer need not justify the approach and
question. Also, a person approached in such a manner is under no obligation to
answer the officer's questions and may, presumably, walk away fromthe situation."7
Before 1968, the Fourth Amendment was interpreted to require probable cause
for any type of governmental search or seizure."s The Court took quite a basic
approach to the Fourth Amendment. 9 The analysis focused only on whether a
certain set of circumstances constituted a "search" or "seizure" and, if so, whether
there was probable cause to justify it.' If a certain set of facts were determined to
be a search or seizure, the absence of probable cause created an automatic violation
of the Fourth Amendment.2 Before Terry, there appeared to be no "middle ground"
in Fourth Amendment analyses.22
The decision in Terry v. Ohio produced a narrow exception to the rigid analysis
previously applied by the Court and created a middle ground standard of
cause-reasonable suspicion-for brief investigatory stops. 23 Such stops would be
valid without the requirement of probable cause if supported by a lower standard
of reasonable suspicion. In Terry, the petitioner and another man were noticed by
a police officer in downtown Cleveland, Ohio.24 The officer observed the two men
alternately walk up and down the same street. On each trip, the respective man
would peer into the same store window.' After approximately a dozen trips, a third
man met the two men and the three individuals conversed. The third man
subsequently left the area and the two men continued pacing the street. 2 Finally, the
two men walked away in the direction the third man had taken. The officer followed
the two men and observed them once again meet up with the third man. The officer
then decided to approach the individuals. After briefly asking the men their names
and receiving a mumbled response, the officer grabbed Terry and patted down the
outside of his clothing.27 Inside Terry's coat pocket the officer found a .38-caliber
revolver.28 Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.29
In Terry, the Court's analysis of the Fourth Amendment changed from a twooption approach (probable cause or no probable cause) to a three-option approach
(probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or neither). The Terry majority, written by
Chief Justice Warren, held that the extent of Fourth Amendment protection depends
on the specific context of each situation and the reasonableness of the government's
identification. Id. Here, the Court held that the stop went beyond simply approaching the defendant and asking a
few investigative questions. See id. at 502. Therefore, the stop was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See id.
at 502-03.
17. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98.
18. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-209 (1979) (discussing the historical development of

the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable seizures of persons).
19. See Undauer, supra note 4, at 839-40.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
See id.
See id
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.at 6-7.
Id.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
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action within that context.' Although the opinion focused mainly on the "frisk"
aspect of the "stop and frisk,"'" later Supreme Court cases have viewed Terry as
requiring a separate analysis for the stop as well as the frisk.32
Since the Terry decision, the "stop" portion of the analysis has been further
explored. The Court continues to articulate what constitutes a reasonable,
articulable suspicion for purposes of an investigatory stop. For example, four years
after the Terry decision, the Court specifically addressed the subject of a "stop" in
Adams v. Williams.3 3 The Court in Adams reasoned that a brief stop of a suspicious
individual in order to determine his identity or momentarily maintain the status quo
while obtaining more information may be the most reasonable alternative in light
of the facts known to the officer at the time. 4 However, the officer must have a
reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot in order to make a
,,stop. ,35
In Ybarra v. Illinois,3 6 the Court held that suspicion must again be based on
specific and articulable facts and added that the suspicion must be associated with
the specific individual. 37 The suspicion does not arise merely from the individual's
location. 38 Two years later, in United States v. Cortez, the Court focused on the
necessity of looking to the totality of the circumstances. 39 The Court held that two
elements must be present for a permissible investigatory stop. First, a police officer
must consider all of the surrounding circumstances in analyzing a situation.' It is
only by looking at the totality of the circumstances that an officer may draw
30. See id. at 9. The Court held that police may frisk a suspect when a reasonably prudent officer would be
justified in believing that the suspect is armed. See id. at 24.
31. See id at 19,n. 16. Justice Warren chose not to address whether investigatory stops made with less than
probable cause were, for purposes of detention, constitutional because he was unsure that a "seizure" had happened
prior to the officer's initiation of physical contact with Terry. Justices Harlan and White, each writing a concurring
opinion, separated the "stop" portion of the analysis from the actual "frisk," asserting that a valid stop is necessary
before a valid frisk. See id. at 32-33, 34.
32. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-146 (1972). Reasonable suspicion to stop an individual
should be based on "specific reasonable inferences" that officers are "entitled to draw from the facts in light of
[their] experience." Terry, 393 U.S. at 27. The test, therefore, is whether a reasonably cautious police officer, based
on the totality of the circumstances, has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. See id
33. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 144. In Adams, a police officer in an area of high crime was approached by a
known individual and told that an individual seated in a nearby car was carrying narcotics and had a gun at his
waist. Id. at 144-45. The officer approached the car and asked the individual to open the door. Id. at 145. When
the individual rolled down his window instead, the officer reached into the car and took the gun located in the exact
place indicated by the informant. Id. The Court held this to be a valid stop. Id. at 144.
34. Id. at 146.
35. See id. at 146-47.
36. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
37. See id. at 91.
38. See id.In Ybarra, police obtained a search warrant, based on probable cause, for a tavern and the
bartender who worked within. Id. at 88. The police proceeded to stop and pat down the other tavern patrons for
weapons. Id. One of the patrons was found in possession of heroin. Id. at 89. The Court held that the police were
unable to articulate any specific fact that would have created the reasonable suspicion that the patron was armed
and dangerous. Id. at 91.
39. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). In Cortez, the border patrol observed distinctive footprints and tire
tracks and determined that groups of illegal aliens were receiving help from one or more individuals in a vehicle.
Id. at 413. Based on the times that they observed the tracks, the border patrol also determined that the individual
or individuals also traveled on clear nights, during or near weekends, and between the hours of two A.M. and six
A.M. Id. at 413-14. The Court found this information created the reasonable suspicion required to make a
constitutional stop of Cortez's vehicle. Id. at 421-22.
40. Id. at 418.
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inferences as a trained person in the field of law enforcement."' Second, the
officer's analysis must generate a "particularized suspicion" that the individual may
be involved in some sort of crime in order to stop him or her.42 The Court affords
considerable deference to observations and conclusions of police, reasoning that
they are trained in the area of criminal activity and may have more insight than the
lay observer. 3
It is important to note, however, that the Court has been skeptical of certain
factors. For instance, an officer may not rely solely on an individual's race to make
a stop." In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, Border Patrol agents assigned to a
Southern California highway chose to stop vehicles with passengers who appeared
to be of Mexican descent.4 The Court held the stops to be unlawful.' While the
Court made it clear that race, by itself, does not satisfy the reasonable suspicion
standard, it never stated explicitly that race can not be used in combination with
other factors to create the requisite reasonable suspicion.47
Finally, in relation to anonymous tips, the Court has held that information from
an informant that exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability can create the reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory stop. This idea was explored in Alabama v. White, in
which an anonymous informant was correctly able to describe an individual's
vehicle, time of departure, and destination.' The reliability of the tip in White was
examined on a sliding scale. The Court determined that a tip containing a greater
quantity of corroborative information is more reliable.'9 The Court reasoned that if
an informant is unknown or anonymous, greater corroboration might be necessary
to create reasonable suspicion."0 In the same way, a tip with less corroboration but
from a known source may also suffice to create reasonable suspicion."s
The Supreme Court cases following Terry addressed fact situations at or near the
threshold for reasonable suspicion. Often, the addition or subtraction of a single fact
can make the difference between a lawful and unlawful stop. The Wardlow and J. L
decisions are two more extremely close cases that required the Supreme Court to
once again examine factual circumstances that may or may not rise to reasonable
suspicion.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
the Usual
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at417-18.
Id. at 418; see also Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
Id. at 876.
Id.
Fora more detailed discussion of race and the Fourth Amendment see Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping
Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L REv. 956 (1999).
496 U.S. 325, 326-27 (1990).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 330-32.
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972).
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I. ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW
A. Statement of the Case
On September 9, 1995, Officer Timothy Nolan (Officer Nolan) was traveling in
a police caravan in Chicago, Illinois.5 2 The purpose of the caravan was to
investigate an area known for narcotics activity. Officer Nolan was driving the last
car of four and was in uniform. Soon after arriving in the area, the officers spotted
forty-four year-old Sam Wardlow (Wardlow). At the time, Wardlow did not appear
to be taking part in any unlawful activity. When Wardlow spotted the police
caravan, however, he immediately turned and fled. Officer Nolan followed
Wardlow and was eventually able to comer him in an alleyway. Officer Nolan
observed Wardlow carrying a white, opaque bag. Without announcing himself or
giving a warning, Officer Nolan conducted a protective pat down search of
Wardlow. Because Officer Nolan was unable to see into the bag, he squeezed it and
felt a heavy object that he believed to be a gun. Officer Nolan opened the bag and
found a .38-caliber handgun containing five live rounds of ammunition. Based on
his discovery, Officer Nolan placed Wardlow under arrest.
At trial, the court denied Wardlow's motion to suppress evidence of the gun,
ruling that the search was a lawful stop and frisk. Wardlow was subsequently
convicted of the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and sentenced to a two-year
imprisonment. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the conviction, reasoning that
53
Officer Nolan did not have the reasonable suspicion required to justify the stop.
The court based its reversal on the totality of the circumstances test set forth in
Terry v. Ohio.' The court wrote that "to justify an investigatory stop, the police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that reasonably warrant
the intrusion."55 In its Terry analysis, however, the appellate court examined only
the "sudden flight" factor. It was unable to find support in the record for the
contention that Wardlow was in a high crime location.' Consequently, because the
court looked only at the fact that Wardlow ran from the police, it was unable to
determine that Officer Nolan had the requisite reasonable suspicion required to stop
Wardlow. The court emphasized its limited holding and declared, "we do not hold
that the presence of a suspect in a high crime location, together with his subsequent
flight from police, is never grounds for a Terry stop.""
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court using the
Terry test.58 Unlike the appellate court, however, the Illinois Supreme Court was
able to conclude that Wardlow was in an area known for heavy crime. The court
looked at the downtown Chicago area and the "uncontradicted and undisputed
testimony [of Officer Nolan], which was accepted by the trial court, [and found it]

52. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). Unless otherwise noted, all facts in this section are taken
from Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121-22.
53. Illinois v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 67-68 (1997).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 67 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
56. Id. at 67.
57. U at 68.
58. illinois v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484 (1998).
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sufficient to establish that the incident took place in a high-crime area."5 9 Thus,
instead of examining only the flight factor, the Illinois Supreme Court also
considered the area of heavy crime in reaching its determination. Despite the
additional factor, however, the court was still unable to hold that the circumstances
rose to a level of reasonable suspicion.' The court looked to other jurisdictions for
guidance in its decision. In Nebraska v. Hicks, for instance, flight from a police
officer was sufficient to justify an investigatory stop only when coupled with
specific knowledge connecting the person to involvement in criminal conduct.6 The
court further examined "specific knowledge" by looking to Michigan case law. In
People v. Mamon,62 the court noted "the ambiguous nature of flight as an indicator
of guilt" and held that "the act of running at the sight of police patrolling a highcrime area did not provide the particularized grounds necessary to support a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot."' 63
The Illinois court agreed with the reasoning of the Michigan court and applied
it to the facts of Wardlow. The court explained that the officers were "operating
under a suspicion or hunch" rather than "specific and articulable facts" that would
have justified the stop." Therefore, unlike the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme
Court chose not to limit its holding and ruled that, taken in the totality, sudden flight
in an area of high crime does not create reasonable suspicion.
In a five-to-four decision,65 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Illinois
Supreme Court holding that, taken in the totality of the circumstances, sudden flight
in an area of high crime creates the requisite reasonable suspicion required for an
officer to lawfully stop an individual.6
B. Rationale
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, the Court in Illinoisv. Wardlow held that
unprovoked flight in a neighborhood of high crime creates the reasonable suspicion
required for an investigatory stop. Using the analysis first applied in Terry,67 the

59. Id. at 486.
60. Id. at 489.

61. 488 N.W.2d 359,363 (1992). In Hicks, two police officers stopped a man who ran away from police
in an area of Omaha, Nebraska, known for liquor violations and drug trafficking. After further investigation, the
officers found the man in possession of a firearm. The man was subsequently charged for being a felon in
possession. The court was unable to conclude that flight from police in an area known for crime activity rose to
the level of reasonable suspicion. Id.
62. 435 N.W.2d 12 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, 457 N.W.2d 623 (1990). In Manion, two police officers
were driving on routine patrol in an area known for heavy narcotic activity. As they approached the defendant, he
turned and ran from the officers. As the officers chased the defendant, he removed a case from his jacket and
dropped it. The case was later found to contain cocaine. The trial court, however, chose to quash an information
charging the defendant with possession of a controlled substance, and the Michigan appeals court affirmed the trial
court decision.
63. Illinois v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484,488 (1998).
64. Id.
65. The majority decision was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist andjoined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part was written by Justice Stevens and
was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 528 U.S. 119.
66. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).
67. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

Court examined the situation faced by Officer Nolan. The opinion acknowledged
that reasonable suspicion is less demanding than the probable cause standard and
requires considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence." The opinion also
acknowledged, however, that the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal
level of objective justification for making a stop.69
The Court concluded that Officer Nolan relied on two factors in his decision to
stop Wardlow. First, Officer Nolan was a member of a four-car caravan of
policemen in a neighborhood known for heavy drug activity. The officers were
aware of the reputation of the area and approached the situation within this context.
The Court emphasized that a crime-ridden neighborhood does not, by itself, create
a reasonable suspicion to stop an individual.70 By the same token, however, an
officer should not ignore his surroundings when trying to determine whether
circumstances deserve further investigation."' Consequently, the Court determined
that a high-crime area is a part of an officer's surroundings and may be taken into
consideration as a factor in a Terry analysis.
The second factor that Officer Nolan observed was Wardlow's unprovoked and
sudden flight.72 The Court explained that in the past it had recognized nervous and
73
evasive behavior as a pertinent factor in the determination of reasonable suspicion.
"Headlong flight," the Court reasoned, "is the consummate act of evasion" and
while not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, "it is certainly suggestive of
such., 74 The Court recognized the imperfection of the Terry test in that it tends to
be a subjective test applied by a police officer. The Court conceded that reasonable
suspicion is ultimately a judgment call based on common sense and inferences
about human behavior. 75 Flight does not by itself constitute reasonable suspicion;
however, taken together with the fact that the flight took place in a high crime
neighborhood, the two factors met the totality of the circumstances test. Therefore,
Officer Nolan had grounds for reasonable suspicion and the subsequent stop of
Wardlow.
The Court distinguished its holding in Wardlow from previous cases that have
held a refusal to cooperate with police does not rise to the level of reasonable
suspicion. Specifically, the Court noted that it concluded in Floridav. Royer that
when an officer approaches an individual without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, "the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his
business."7 6 In Wardlow, however, Rehnquist distinguished flight by explaining that
7
flight, by its very nature, is the opposite of "going about one's business."7 An
officer confronted with the flight of an individual may choose to briefly stop the

68. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123.
69. Id.
70. id. at 124.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1995); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S.
1,6 (1984); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989)).
74. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124(2000).
75. Id. at 125 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)).
76. Id. at 125 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)).
77. Id.
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person. The act of stopping the individual, the Court contended, is completely
consistent with a citizen's right to go about his business or to refuse to answer a
police officer's questions.7 8
In his brief, the Respondent Wardlow argued that flight is not necessarily
indicative of criminal activity. He explained that without corroborating
circumstances that an individual is involved in criminal activity prior to flight, an
officer's observation of flight creates nothing more than a hunch.79 Rehnquist
acknowledged and agreed with this point. He observed, however, that just because
flight may be ambiguous and susceptible to innocent explanation, the Terry case
established that officers might detain an individual to resolve the ambiguity.' The
Court chose to accept the risk that officers may stop innocent people.8 It also
contended that compared to a full arrest, a Terry stop is a minimal intrusion on an
individual's liberty. 2 Consequently, after a person has been subject to a Terry stop,
he is free to leave unless an officer can show the requisite probable cause to arrest.83
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, wrote a longer
and more detailed discussion of the "stop and frisk" analysis in his dissenting
opinion. Stevens began by addressing the two proposed rules set out by the
petitioner and respondent. In its brief, the Petitioner State of Illinois proposed a
"bright-line rule" that would authorize the temporary detention of anyone who
chooses to flee at the mere sight of a police officer." On the other hand, the
respondent suggested a rule proposing that flight upon seeing an officer can never,
by itself, justify a temporary investigative stop under Terry.8" Stevens rejected both
of the proposed rules and concurred with the totality of the circumstances test used
by the majority. He was, however, unable to agree that the facts of the Wardlow
case rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. Before explaining his disagreement
with the majority's ultimate conclusion, Stevens first analyzed the two proposed
rules set forth by the petitioner and respondent.
Stevens first recognized that in Terry v. Ohio the Court held that, in appropriate
circumstances, a police officer may approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest."' He explained that in "conducting an investigatory stop [an officer] must
articulate 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity."'8 7 The question in this case, Stevens pointed out, was
what kind of suspicion attaches to a person's flight--or, more precisely, what
commonsense conclusions can be drawn respecting the motives behind that flight.8 8
The dissent explained its rejection of the petitioner and respondent's proposed per

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Respondent's Brief at 29, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (No. 98-1036).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
Id at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 127 (2000).
Id. at 128 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417-18 (1981)).
Id.
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89
se rules by looking to the different and many possible motivations for flight. From
catching up with a friend a few blocks away to seeking shelter from a storm to
"answer[ing] the call of nature," the dissent suggested a number of innocent reasons
people tend to run.' The dissent explained that flight must also be judged in
connection with other factors including "the time of day, the number of people in
the area, the character of the neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the
way the runner was dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, and whether the
'
person's behavior was otherwise unusual."91
The dissent rejected the petitioner's per se rule regarding "unprovoked flight
upon seeing a clearly identifiable police officer," explaining that the inferences may
still vary from case to case. 2 The Respondent's per se rule was also dismissed by
the dissent. The dissent found that inferences taken from flight are a function of the
varied circumstances that surround it.93 Stevens explained that "[slometimes those
inferences are entirely consistent with the presumption of innocence, sometimes
they justify further investigation, and sometimes they justify an immediate stop and
search for weapons."' The dissent pointed out that in any circumstance,
unprovoked flight describes a category of activity too broad and varied to permit95a
per se reasonable inference regarding the motivation for the activity.
Consequently, like the majority, the dissent rejected the proposed per se rules of
both the petitioner and respondent.
The second portion of the dissent addressed the majority's analysis under the
totality of the circumstances test. Stevens found the facts of the Wardlow case
insufficient to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. He focused on the
96
troublesome and brief testimony of Officer Nolan and what it failed to reveal.
First, Officer Nolan could not remember whether the cars in the caravan were
marked or whether there were other people near Wardlow when the caravan drove
by.97 Second, the officers were on their way to an unidentified location and were
98
apparently not planning to stop in the area where Wardlow was first spotted.
Third, the record did not indicate how fast the caravan was traveling.' Additionally,
the record did not indicate whether some of the caravan had passed Wardlow before
he began running."0 The only inference that the majority relied upon, contended the
dissent, was Officer Nolan's statement that "[h]e looked in our direction and began
fleeing."' 0' Stevens found this statement insufficient at best. He also looked to the
"high-crime area" factor and found it simply "too generic and susceptible to
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innocent explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry."'" Consequently,
the dissent found the facts of Wardlow did not meet the reasonable suspicion
standard.
IV. FLORIDA V. J.L.
A. Statement of the Case
On October 13, 1995, the Miami-Dade police received an anonymous tip
concerning a young African-American male."° The tip explained that the boy would
be found standing at a specific bus stop wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun.
After receiving the tip, the police arrived at the specified bus stop to find a group
of three African-American males. The individuals were not engaged in illegal
activity or any other suspicious behavior; however, one of the officers immediately
told J.L., a fifteen year-old male wearing a plaid shirt, to place his hands on the bus
stop." ° The officer then frisked J.L. and found a gun in his left pocket. Another
officer frisked the two other males but found nothing. The officers proceeded to
arrest J.L. J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and
with possessing a firearm while under the age of eighteen. At trial, he moved to
suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search and the court granted the motion.
The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that verification of the
description in the anonymous tip was enough to create reasonable suspicion.' °5 The
Florida Supreme Court, however, quashed the appellate decision.
To reach its decision, the Florida Supreme Court looked to the Supreme Court
decision in Alabamav. White.106There, the Court determined that an anonymous tip
could create reasonable suspicion if the tip, itself, could be found reliable. The
Florida court acknowledged that "innocent details of identification" may be reliable
and consequently may be the foundation for reasonable suspicion. 7 In J.L,
however, the "tip did not involve suspicious behavior that the police could have
verified as suspicious upon arrival; rather, the tip involved innocent details, none
of which involved incriminating or criminal behavior."'"" The court also took issue
with the fact that "the innocent details provided in the tip did not involve future
action for which the police could verify whether or not such future action would
occur; rather the tip involved present action which could have been provided by any
pilgrim on the roadway."'" Finally, the court noted that the tip was not corroborated
in any way by independent police investigation. "o Based on this reasoning, the
court was unable to conclude that the tip in J.L. exhibited the "sufficient 'indicia of
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See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,268 (2000). Unless otherwise noted, all facts in this section are taken
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496 U.S. 325 (1990).
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reliability"' to create the requisite reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop.'
Consequently, the Florida Supreme Court found the search was a violation of J.L.'s
Fourth Amendment rights.
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Florida
Supreme Court's reasoning that an anonymous tip, with only the corroboration of
innocent details, does not rise to the reasonable suspicion standard required for a
lawful stop and frisk.
B. Rationale
Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion, holding that when an anonymous tip with
minimal corroboration is the only piece of information the police have to support
their reasonable suspicion and subsequent stop, the Fourth Amendment has been
violated.
Justice Ginsburg began her analysis by presenting the question of whether an
anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more information,
sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk." 2 Similar to the opinion in
Wardlow, the J.L opinion first outlined the history of "stop and frisk" cases
beginning with Terry v. Ohio. Ginsburg focused on the circumstances of Terry and
how the police officer observed unusual conduct that led him to reasonably
conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may have been afoot."'
Unlike Terry, however, the officers' suspicion in J.L. did not arise from any of their
own observations but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an
unknown caller." 4 The Court looked to Alabama v. White' and acknowledged that
"an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge
or veracity."' " 6 There are, however, some situations where the tip "exhibits
7
sufficient indicia of reliability to provide [the requisite] reasonable suspicion."'
Ginsburg analyzed the facts of the White case, in which the police received an
anonymous tip about a woman who was carrying cocaine and predicted that she
would leave a particular apartment building at a particular time, get into a specific
car, and drive to a named motel."' It was only after the police observed the woman
and found that the tipster accurately predicted the woman's movements that the
9
Court found it reasonable to credit the assertion regarding the cocaine. 1' The J.L
Court found the White case, however, to be very near, if not at, the reasonable
suspicion threshold. 2 ° Therefore, in comparing the circumstances of White to those
of J.L., the Court found that the tip in J.L "lacked the moderate indicia of
reliability" needed to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.'21 The tip provided
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no predictive information that would have permitted the police to test the reliability
and credibility of the information. 22 Additionally, the fact that the subsequent frisk
of J.L. yielded the discovery of a firearm was insufficient to create reasonable
suspicion. It is the knowledge of the officers before the stop that determines
whether there was reasonable suspicion to stop the individual. 2 a
Justice Ginsburg rejected the idea submitted by the Petitioner, the State of
Florida, that the identification of J.L. constituted corroboration of the tip. In its
brief, the State of Florida argued that a stop should be permitted "when (1) an
anonymous tip provides a description of a particular person at a particular location
illegally carrying a concealed firearm, (2) police promptly verify the pertinent
details of the tip except the existence of the firearm, and (3) there are no factors that
cause doubt in the reliability of the tip."'" The Court asserted, however, that the
Petitioner's proposal was incorrect. The tip must be "reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just its tendency to identify a determinate person." ' 5
The Court further rejected a firearm exception to the standard Terry analysis as
requested by the petitioners. Under the proposed exception, any tip regarding a
firearm would create reasonable suspicion. Justice Ginsburg explained that an
exception for tips concerning firearms would simply open too many doors for law
enforcement officers. Not only could an individual subject another to an
but, additionally, such
unreasonable search simply by placing an anonymous call,
12 6
an exception could not be securely confined to firearms.
Finally, Justice Ginsburg noted that a tip concerning immediate dangers such as
bombs might not require the "indicia of reliability" that other tips require. She also
in no way minimized a police officer's choice, in accord with Terry, to conduct a
protective search of a person who has already been legitimately stopped.'27
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a short concurrence
that expanded on the kind of situation that might constitute corroboration of a tip.
He noted that there are "many indicia of reliability" that have yet to be explored by
the Court. He suggested that a documented tip, through recording or otherwise,
might be better evidence for corroboration. Additionally, he presented a
hypothetical in which a caller with a similar voice calls the police two nights in a
row and accurately predicts criminal activity. Justice Kennedy suggested that on the
third night the caller "ought not be treated automatically like the tip" in J.L. 28 He
explained that under such circumstances, a "plausible argument that experience
cures some of the uncertainty surrounding the anonymity" could be made. 29 Justice
Kennedy also suggested that a face-to-face, yet anonymous citizen-tip might have
some indicia of reliability as opposed to a phone call. '" Nonetheless, despite Justice
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Kennedy's hypothetical situations, he explained that "these matters.. .must await
discussion in other cases, where the issues are presented by the record.''.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Since the decision in Terry v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court has had
many opportunities to examine what articulable facts meet the reasonable suspicion
standard. The inquiry, however, is highly fact specific. Consequently, the Supreme
Court has revisited the issue on a fairly regular basis. Each time, the Court is faced
with a certain set of facts and must determine whether or not the reasonable
suspicion standard has been met. Wardlow and J.L are two of the latest cases that
attempt to discern what facts may legitimately be considered in satisfying the
reasonable suspicion standard. In examining post-Terry cases and the Wardlow and
J.L decisions, it is apparent that the Court is still defining the threshold
requirements for the reasonable suspicion standard.
A. Illinois v. Wardlow
The five-to-four decision in Wardlow illustrates how the Supreme Court
continues to grapple with ambiguous circumstances and the reasonable suspicion
standard. In Wardlow the Court worked with two factors, Wardlow's flight from the
officers and Wardlow's presence in a high-crime area of downtown Chicago. Of the
two factors, the unprovoked flight seemed to be the focus of the majority opinion. 132
In fact, the Court paid very little attention to the element of Wardlow's presence in
a neighborhood known for its high crime.' 33 Instead, the Court focused on
unprovoked flight and how it is suggestive of wrongdoing." 4 In its reasoning, the
Court relied on other cases that recognized nervous and evasive behavior as a
pertinent factor in the determination of reasonable suspicion.'35
The Court's emphasis on unprovoked flight was notable. Despite the fact that
numerous state cases have found flight alone insufficient to meet the reasonable
suspicion standard,' 36 the tone of the Wardlow opinion seems to imply that
unprovoked flight, on its own, may someday create the required reasonable
suspicion for a stop. Justice Rehnquist wrote that "[h]eadlong flight...is the
consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is
certainly suggestive of such."' 37 And while the Court did not explicitly state that
flight, alone, would create reasonable suspicion, the notion logically follows the
majority's willingness to accept the risk of detaining innocent individuals. Justice
Rehnquist recognized that certain behavior, by itself, might be lawful. The same
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behavior, however, might also suggest unlawful activity. ' Consequently, an officer
may detain an individual in order to resolve the ambiguity.' 39 The Fourth
Amendment, the Court explained, accepts the risk of arresting an individual, based
on probable cause, who may later turn out to be innocent."4 The Court made clear
that the minimal intrusion involved in a short detention is better than permitting
unlawful activities to go unchecked. A brief stop, as opposed to an arrest, is
substantially less intrusive to an individual's privacy. Therefore, the Court did not
foreclose the possibility that unprovoked flight, by itself, could meet the reasonable
suspicion standard.
The Court in Wardlow minimized the intrusiveness of a brief stop and also found
unprovoked flight to be indicative of criminal activity. These two points seem to
indicate that unprovoked flight alone could justify a brief investigatory stop. Of
course, the more interesting and telling situation would be the one in which an
individual suddenly took flight from an officer in an affluent neighborhood. From
the reasoning in Wardlow, ajustification could be made for a brief detention in such
a case. The Wardlow majority made clear that the "minimal intrusion" of a Terry
stop is worth the prevention of criminal activity. This presumption should hold true
in any neighborhood, not simply one known for it's prevalent crime.
The four dissenters, including Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
also focused on the unprovoked flight aspect of this case; however, the dissent took
a closer look at the fact that Wardlow was in an area of high crime. According to
the dissent, even a brief detention is a serious intrusion and, unlike the position
taken in the majority opinion, should be seriously considered. The dissenters feared
that the factors the majority relied upon are simply "too generic and susceptible to
innocent explanation to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry."'' The dissent
appeared to be looking for more specific factors that indicate possible criminal
activity in a police officer's determination of reasonable suspicion. Many times, an
officer's determination that a neighborhood has a crime problem is subjective.
Despite the majority's focus on Wardlow's sudden flight, this factor troubled the
dissent. People can run for innocent as well as guilty reasons, even from the police.
Finally, the dissent also expressed concern about the fact that the foundation for
reasonable suspicion was based primarily on the somewhat "weak" testimony of
Officer Nolan. Instead, the dissent argued that the testimony of Officer Nolan
lacked sufficient details needed to establish reasonable suspicion. The dissent would
have required additional, specific facts that were more indicative of criminal
behavior before it would be willing to conclude that the situation in Wardlow rose
to the level of reasonable suspicion. As such, the dissent recognized the subjective
nature of reasonable suspicion analysis.
While the majority opinion in Wardlow seems to suggest that unprovoked flight,
on its own, could meet the reasonable suspicion standard, it is unlikely that the
Court will create such a precedent if faced with the situation. In view of the five-tofour split, it is unclear as to whether some of the Justices would have still been
138. I at 125.
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willing to join the majority opinion had the "high crime" neighborhood not been a
factor. Wardlow is a case very near the reasonable suspicion threshold. The case
helps to once again illustrate the importance of articulating as many facts as
possible when making a stop in order to avoid issues regarding reasonable
suspicion.
B. Floridav. J.L
The unanimous decision in Floridav. J.L clearly holds that an anonymous tip,
without more, will never rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. While the Court
in Wardlow wrote of its willingness to accept the risk of briefly detaining an
innocent individual, it noted in J.L that there are certainly minimum elements
required to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. In a telling line of the J.L
opinion the Court writes, "If White was a close case on the reliability of anonymous
tips, this one surely falls on the other side of the line."'" The Court appears wary
of anonymous tips and points to two specific problems in permitting them to serve
as the basis for a Terry stop. First, anonymous tips alone "seldom demonstrate the
informant's basis of knowledge or veracity."'a Second, since anonymous tipsters
cannot be held responsible for fabricated allegations, permitting such tips to result
in a Terry stop would increase the potential for harassment through false
accusation.'" A desire to ensure the informants' credibility and accountability
underlies the Court's concern with anonymous tips.
The Court looked at the single anonymous tip and determined that it was simply
too unreliable to permit an investigatory stop. The Court looked to the "assertion
of illegality" in the tip and not just its tendency to identify a particular person.'45 In
this case, the tipster merely gave a description of a group of individuals. It is less
clear, however, as to whether the Court would have found reasonable suspicion had
the police, after receiving the anonymous tip, pursued further investigation
disclosing facts indicative of criminal activity. While the majority did not make
such a suggestion, further investigation may have changed the outcome of the
opinion. For instance, had the police set up surveillance to observe the three young
men, it is possible that the police could have observed more facts that would have
contributed to meeting the reasonable suspicion standard. In his concurrence,
Justice Kennedy seems to have suggested that, had the police chosen to investigate
further, they may have learned additional facts that would have risen to reasonable
suspicion and justified a lawful stop.
The Court also rejected a firearm exception, in which a tip alleging an individual
is in possession of an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk. The risk of
infringing on individual rights by acting on numerous false tips involving firearms
is simply too high. This rejection plainly illustrates the importance of the rights
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
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In view of Florida v. J.L and its predecessor Alabama v. White, the Supreme
Court has offered considerable guidance regarding anonymous tips and the
reasonable suspicion standard. Together, the two cases suggest at least three rules
of guidance. First, both cases make clear that an anonymous tip, without any type
of corroboration, will not meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Second, J.L
provides that an anonymous tip plus the simple corroboration of a person's clothing
or description will also not create reasonable suspicion. Finally, Alabama v. White
holds that reasonable suspicion is met when an anonymous tip predicts events that,
after police observation, eventually occur. With its opinion in J.L, the Court has
taken a somewhat stronger, less equivocal position with regard to anonymous tips
and reasonable suspicion.
VI. CONCLUSION
The two cases described in this Note are but two in a continuing line of cases that
apply the Terry analysis to specific fact situations. In Illinois v. Wardlow and
Floridav. J. L, the Court examined factors that are at or very near the threshold of
the reasonable suspicion standard. In both cases, the Court was forced to examine
some of the more troublesome aspects of the application of the Terry test. The
Wardlow court held that sudden flight in a high crime area, considered in context,
creates the requisite reasonable suspicion required to temporarily detain an
individual. In its conclusion, the Court permitted two arguably ambiguous factors
to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Unfortunately, Wardlow may have left
more questions than it answered. For instance, with the Court's emphasis on
unprovoked flight, it is unclear whether flight on its own could ever create
reasonable suspicion.
In J.L, the Court held that an anonymous tip, on its face, does not create the
reasonable suspicion required to stop an individual. J.L, in combination with
Alabama v. White, has clarified the reasonable suspicion standard with respect to
anonymous tips. It is now unequivocal that an anonymous tip, with only minimal
descriptive corroboration does not meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Given
other evidence, however, such as the corroboration of future events predicted in the
tip in Alabama v. White, it is possible to establish reasonable suspicion.
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